"What do we do with North Korea?" an essay

The following is a paper I wrote for Contemporary Christian Ethics last semester. I have not changed anything since I handed it in last spring, so some information may need to be updated. I decided to leave it in its raw form for this blog, though. Please do not steal any of this work! If you read to the bottom of it, I hope you enjoy it! I am also hopeful that I don't get tracked down by Kim Jong il. (by the way, he and I share the same birthday...)


"Today’s conflict between North Korea and the international community started over 50 years ago. To understand tension today, one must be aware of Korea’s past. Starting with the armistice after the Korean War in the 1950s, the Korean peninsula was divided by the United States and Russia. The south (Republic of Korea) was controlled by the United States, and a pro-American leader was ushered into power to establish democracy. In the north (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), Russia positioned Kim Il Sung as the leader, and a communist government was established. There was increased tension in Korea, as neither side felt the war ended simply by signing an armistice, and many thought the country would not remain divided permanently. Ever since then, both the North and South have expressed interest in reunification. This has become more of a dream since the 1950s as many factors have driven more division between the countries on the peninsula. Also until recently, the ROK was heavily influenced by the US government and military presence in the country after the war, but now leaders are breaking off of American influence.
After the war, the north developed more rapidly than the south, but it was not long before the ROK surpassed the north to its current position as the 10th largest economy in the world. On the other hand, the DPRK has been struggling since the collapse of the Soviet bloc and since it receives diminished support from other communist countries like China. With only a small percentage of land useful for production and the government determined to be self-sufficient with its Juche idea, many North Koreans are hungry. In 2002, 40 percent of children were stunted due to malnutrition and 20% were underweight, according to World Health Organization standards (World Hunger). Floods and famine in the 1990s killed nearly one million North Koreans and depleted the country’s food sources, forcing the government to open its borders to outside aid. This was a revolutionary opening for the “Hermit Kingdom”, even though it had so tight a control over agencies that they could not effectively distribute aid throughout the DPRK.
The ROK supported its neighbor then, and it continues to support the DPRK today in its “Sunshine Policy” initiative. It supplies the north with more food than any other country. The ROK is also starting to break ranks from the US to favor the DPRK, namely through its decision not to back the North Korean Human Rights Act initiated by the US in the United Nations. Dialogue has increased between the north and south as both want reunification on the peninsula, but they each have their own goals of that happening. One issue blocking that process is difference in the two countries’ forms of government. Some think the south will eventually absorb the north to form a democratic peninsula, while the DPRK government wants a country united under its communist control.
Another issue in Korea is heightened military tension along the Demilitarized Zone, the 38th parallel that divides the two countries. Called the “most dangerous place on the planet”, UN, US and ROK troops and a wide range of missiles face about 1.7 million DPRK military members and weapons. In addition to this tension since the Korean War, the international community has dealt with North Korean claims at building nuclear facilities and creating nuclear weapons. The United States and its allies have pressured the DPRK to abandon nuclear technology, and many believe the DPRK is the biggest threat to other Asian countries. Its nuclear program has halted international trade and delayed progress in six-party talks.
The last major issue that will briefly be touched on in this case study is human rights violations in the DPRK. It is known that Koreans in the north suffer from extreme rights violations, having no freedom of speech, religion, press or travel, among other abuses. Defectors from the north tell of concentration camps for individuals who violate laws established to silence them. Only two political parties besides the Korean Workers’ Party exist in the DPRK, but they are controlled by the KWP and, in the end, seek to support the regime (World). The only media in the north is controlled by the government, and Koreans are not free to move about inside or outside the country.
The US and the international community have tried negotiations with the DPRK starting with the Agreed Framework in 1994. Main components of the deal involve the US replacing the DPRK’s nuclear power facilities with light water reactor power plants (LWR), normalization of political and economic relations, the DPRK remaining a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspections at nuclear facilities. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was formed by neighboring countries and the US to implement the Agreed Framework. Construction of the LWR’s did not begin until 2002 and was stopped later that year, never to be resumed. KEDO oil shipments to the DPRK, also part of the Agreed Framework, were also stopped in 2002 after open hostility between the DPRK and the US flared over nuclear weaponry advancements in the DPRK. Then in 2003, the DPRK withdrew from the NPT and by 2005 said it had created nuclear weapons. This has not been confirmed by the international community, because the DPRK has not tested the weapons. Some critics say that, if the DPRK tests, UN and US military forces would launch a military attack against the country.
The Agreed Framework is a good place to start when discussing the nuclear conflict in the DPRK. It shows the DPRK’s fear of the US military, as one part of the agreement involves formal assurance that the US will not use nuclear weapons to strike the north. When the DPRK allegedly restarted its nuclear weapons program in 2005, it justified the weapons as a “nuclear deterrent for self-defense” (DPRK FM). The Agreed Framework also shows the US is to blame, in part, for the nuclear conflict in the DPRK. If the US does not hold up its end of the agreement, it cannot expect the DPRK to as well. While the US may have endorsed the Agreed Framework because it suspected the DPRK government would collapse soon after the death of Kim Il Sung and it would not have to live up to agreements, and while the new US Republican government did not support the initiative by the Clinton administration, it missed out on an opportunity to divert a nuclear crisis.
Reviewing measures of the Agreed Framework it failed to uphold and updating the agreement with the DPRK would promote stability on the peninsula and would better normalize relations with the US. This could be done as an element of six-party talks, which would engage other countries to hold the US and DPRK responsible to their goals. With the DPRK’s draw to participating in six-party talks, it seems interested in resuming negotiations with neighboring countries. Participants in six-party talks are anxiously waiting for the DPRK’s commitment to involvement in the next round of talks.
Applying Russell Daye’s principle of political forgiveness could start open dialogue between countries. If the US apologized to the DPRK and members of six-party talks for failing to execute its end of the Agreed Framework and accepting responsibility for the current instability with the DPRK and Asia, tension may be alleviated on the peninsula. In order for “grounds for membership in a moral community” to be established, the apology must be accepted by the DPRK, and it should in turn apologize for its wrongdoings (Daye 62). However, the US apology must come “‘from a position of humility,” something the US is not used to (Daye 75). The apology is “very different from attempts to integrate moral community by shaping those outside one’s community to resemble those inside,” which is precisely what is happening on the Korean peninsula (Daye 75). It is right to want the DPRK to abandon its nuclear program and disarm, but the US cannot expect this to happen immediately and in sync with a political and economic change. A moral community is possible by simply starting continuous dialogue with the DPRK.
Daye’s theory presents a problem if the DPRK rejects the US apology and encouragement to return to the Agreed Framework. The US would then be viewed as weak and giving in to DPRK demands. If the US government toughened its stance after the rejection, it would appear that the US meant nothing by its apology to begin with, and it would be trusted even less on the peninsula. The apology would come as a surprise and could be viewed as a trick, especially in light of President Bush’s remark about the DPRK as a member of the “axis of evil”. Stephen Chapman comments on this with, “from long experience … the language of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ makes fashioning compromise significantly more difficult” (Chapman 93). Distinguishing the DPRK as evil makes an apology very difficult. Also, with the DPRK’s history of not keeping its word and its mysterious involvement with nuclear technology, an apology presents touchy ground to tread on; the international community would be uncomfortable having the ball in the DPRK’s court. All-in-all, a US apology to the DPRK for failing to uphold its components of the Agreed Framework is risky when taking the DPRK’s history into account, so Daye’s theory is not the best solution for US-DPRK relations.
A major problem for relations with the DPRK is the country’s leader- Kim Jong-Il. He has total control over the country and has established himself as a god to the North Koreans, which makes his task to brainwash and oppress them much easier. The people believe that the ROK is simply a puppet of the US government, and that the US is responsible for North Korean deaths during the war, which the DPRK government tells its people the US started. There is widespread hate among North Koreans towards the US. Thus, a possible solution of regime change must be ruled out. If the US captured or killed Kim Jong-Il, Koreans may start an uprising against democratic forces, and it would solidify their thoughts of the US as an enemy to North Korean people. They would revolt against any North Korean who would attempt to assassinate their “Dear Leader”, too. This also poses a problem if the regime should fall. With an entire country brainwashed to view Kim Jong-Il as a god and hate outside governments, it would be increasingly difficult to try to establish order among the people and to persuade them to follow anyone besides Kim Jong-Il. After witnessing the shaky events of the Korean War and the fierce division on the peninsula, one must assume a remotely smooth transition would be extremely difficult. Thus, a regime change in the DPRK is improbable and is not the best solution. The international community could try to convince the DPRK government to reform like China. Although it is still a tightly controlled country, China has fewer human rights abuses, and the government has benefited enormously from opening its economy to outside trade. This might prove to be fruitful, since the DPRK has better relations with China than with most other countries.
China plays a very important mediator role in six-party talks, as it allies with the DPRK while attempting to better relations with the US. With the approaching meeting of President Bush and Chinese president Hu Jintao, Bush is expected to pressure Jintao to coax the DPRK into returning to six-party talks, while Jintao will discuss the US accusations of DPRK counterfeiting US money and economic sanctions. The US would also like China to impose sanctions against the DPRK and to take a hard-line against the DPRK’s nuclear program. The DPRK quickly fell after the Soviet bloc deteriorated, and with a decrease in aid and political support from China, Kim Jong-Il would need to rethink his actions. This would especially be effective if the ROK joined in sanctions against the DPRK, although that is highly unlikely with the current views of the ROK government. A concerted effort is needed for sanctions to work most effectively against the DPRK. The United States’ actions in freezing bank accounts and encouraging banks to refrain from doing business with DPRK companies are taking a toll on the north. While US efforts may be very effective, the DPRK argues these actions are keeping it from returning to six-party talks. Unless other countries pressure the DPRK, the US will continue to be the sole major enforcer of pressure on the DPRK and will continue to be viewed in a hostile manner.
In addition to the DPRK staying out of six-party talks, the North Korean people will be oppressed even more with economic sanctions. The DPRK is allegedly spending more money on its military than it should, given the country’s widespread hunger and need to import food. The DPRK’s Juche belief in self-reliance is making it increasingly instable. The DPRK lacks electricity and has always struggled with having only a small percentage of arable land. Its closed and controlling nature also makes it challenging for outside agencies to assess the DPRK’s needs and properly distribute adequate aid. According to the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, the United States has contributed more than $600 million of the $2 billion in aid to the DPRK in the last decade; As much as half of the aid never reached its intended recipients (Haggard). Sanctions would further stress the country, but given the DPRK’s slow and ineffective actions after widespread famine in the 1990s, or absence of effort to prevent famine, proves the government will not move quickly to help its suffering and dying citizens. Many villages received no aid, and North Koreans resorted to eating tree bark for lack of other resources. No one can assess how long the DPRK would wait to give in to pressure today.
Jean Elshtain’s theory on just war and international justice as equal regard applies to this dimension of DPRK relations. Applying the citizenship model to the Korean people fits, as the US, the “powerful nation”, intervenes on behalf of our fellow human beings who are subject to human rights abuses. Elshtain notes the difference in equal regard and humanitarian intervention, as the US would aid the DPRK not out of pity for the people, but as a requirement of justice for our equals as humans. Elshtain’s model is an armed intervention, however, to “establish a framework for the achievement of a decent, stable international order as the necessary prelude to freedom and to international justice” (Elshtain 141). If we assume the US would lead this armed action against the DPRK, the Korean War could resume in an instant. Unless the US, ROK and UN forces attack only nuclear facilities in the DPRK, involving the military is the wrong option, given the instability on the peninsula and missiles waiting to be fired across the DMZ. However, Elshtain’s model of aid could work without military intervention, and it provides goals to strive for on the Korean peninsula.
Discussion of aid and the DPRK must lead to the ROK and its current policy with the North, the Sunshine Policy. The plan aims to soften the DPRK’s attitudes towards the South by encouraging interaction and economic assistance. Its three main principles are: the ROK will not tolerate armed provocation by the DPRK, the ROK will not attempt to absorb its neighbor, and the ROK ultimately seeks cooperation with the DPRK. The Sunshine Policy stresses the separation of politics and economics to improve the DPRK economy. In practice, ROK businesses are allowed to work with neighboring companies, and the government supplies humanitarian aid to the North. The Sunshine Policy has increased dialogue between high ranking officials on both sides, but it has harmed the ROK’s international support, especially from the US.
I believe that the ROK is on the right track to dealing with the DPRK. It helps the country in humanitarian terms while attempting not to budge in light of military buildup on the peninsula. With stronger positions on the issues in the Sunshine Policy and actually forcing the DPRK to assume responsibilities laid out in the policy, better relations will form on the peninsula. The United States should decrease its role on the peninsula to acting only in six-party talks and allow Korea’s neighbors to take a more active role in dealings. China should step up from its position as moderator in discussions, and it needs to rethink its ties to the DPRK and its new position in the international community. With pressure and sanctions from China and the ROK, the DPRK will lose even more resources and support, and then it will be forced to consider change in domestic and international policies. Economic sanctions should be placed on the DPRK by China and the ROK, in addition to the US, but it should not be led and actively pursued by the US alone. The US government and the ROK need to realize the strain their individual policies are placing on US-ROK relations. These should be considered before one acts alone, and a collaborated effort will prove to be much more effective. In addition to these measures, the US and KEDO need to reconsider the Agreed Framework and determine if any of its measures can be salvaged. If relations are not normalized between the US and the DPRK, they might attempt to decrease tension associated with the disbandment of the Agreed Framework. I do not think the US should formally apologize to the DPRK for instilling fear in the government and decreasing trust and credibility in US policy, because the DPRK took more drastic measures to create international tension. It would also place the US in a weak position to be taken advantage of by the DPRK. The ROK support of the DPRK economy and its attempts to build it up will produce long-range benefits for the peninsula if reunification happens. As for the long-term future of the DPRK, though, I believe this statement is very true: “While a better functioning economy is a prerequisite for solving the hunger problem, it alone will not permanently guarantee a North Korea free from hunger. Only political change can do that” (Haggard). We must hope for a better future in a weakening DPRK. While political change is ideal and would solve a wide range of problems, other issues must be dealt with before that hope becomes more of a possibility. The international community needs to place restraints on the DPRK while helping its people survive in order for political change and transformation in the country to take place."